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Abstract 
“Technical Debt” is a term first used by Ward Cunningham in an experience report in 1992.1 The term refers to the accruing debt 
or downstream cost that happens when short term priorities trump long term lifecycle costs. The term, when introduced, was used
in the context of the development of software systems. However, since 1992, the field of systems engineering has evolved, and it 
has been found that technical debt also applies to the development and construction of systems. This paper takes a contrary view; 
technical debt is discussed mostly in the context of bad practices; the author contends that the focus should be on system 
principles that preclude the introduction, either anticipated or unanticipated, of negative lifecycle impacts. A set of heuristics is 
presented that describes what should be done rather than what should not be done. From these heuristics, some emergent trends 
will be identified. Such trends may be leveraged to design systems with reduced long term lifecycle costs and, on occasion, 
unexpected benefits. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the University of Southern California. 
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1. Introduction 
The term “Technical Debt” was first introduced by Ward Cunningham in an OOPSLA’92 experience report.1 In 
that report, he described the early shipment or delivery of incomplete or insufficiently tested software as “going into 
debt”. That is, the debt would have to be repaid later with interest, as the cost of repairing a delivered system is 
known to be considerably more expensive than the initial in-house cost to construct and fully test the complete 
system in the first place.2 Since then, the definition has been expanded to include the debt incurred by an enterprise3, 
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and there have been whole workshops dedicated to the subject.4 While the accruing of technical debt is generally 
considered to be the result of poor engineering practices, practitioners have proposed cleaner definitions.5 The flip 
side of technical debt is technical credit. Other than a blog by Neil Bornstein6, I have been unable to find any 
credible research or publications on the topic. Consequently, I am proposing a definition that is inclusive of both 
software and systems engineering: 
 
Technical Credit is the investment in the engineering, designing and constructing of software or systems over and 
above the minimum necessary effort, in anticipation of emergent properties paying dividends at a later date.  
 
I suggest certain heuristics to enable the long term benefit of such an investment: 
 
x Risk-centric analysis 
x Error-centric design 
x Macro and micro extensibility 
x Adaptive and autonomous principles applied, where possible, to subsystems and components 
x Over-engineering wherever possible, consistent with resources and schedule 
x Market-centric approach to requirements for subsystems and components 
 
The heuristics are further described in the paragraphs below. 
 
Corollary: Unforeseen or unanticipated emergent properties may result over time providing a significant return on 
investment; in many cases also providing unforeseen benefits to the manufacturer and/or to society at large.  
Where technical debt describes the results of deliberate or unintended poor practices, technical credit accrues 
when there is intentional over-engineering (not gold-plating) of a product or system. In order for the reader to better 
understand the benefits of technical credit, I will describe what I believe to be an example of a product built using 
some, if not all, of the heuristics of technical credit.  
The Ponte Vecchio (see figure 1) is a medieval stone bridge over the river Arno in Italy. After having been 
destroyed several times by flood, it was rebuilt in 1345.7 Since then, it has survived floods and World War II. As the 
science of bridge building was fraught with uncertainty at the time of construction, the builders relied on over-
engineering (e.g. the use of stone instead of wood).  In 1966 there was a catastrophic flood of the Arno that 
destroyed many historical relics in Florence.8 However, the Ponte Vecchio was left unscathed. Contrast that with a 
2013 flood in Colorado, USA that destroyed 30 bridges.9 So on the one hand we have a bridge that has not needed 
rebuilding since 1345, and on the other we have 30 bridges in one US state that needed rebuilding after one flood. 
While it is not feasible to calculate an ROI for the Ponte Vecchio, it is clear that its longevity has resulted in 
considerable savings, both from not requiring reconstruction, and from continuous tourist revenue. 
1.1. Emergent properties of the Ponte Vecchio 
The Ponte Vecchio has become one of the most important tourist attractions in Florence, bringing in millions of 
dollars in revenue each year to the city.10 The bridge was built in 1345; tourism was not something that was even 
conceived of by the designers. Hence, it is an emergent property. The Corridoio Vasariano is a private passageway 
built on the top of the Ponte Vecchio connecting private residences on both sides of the Arno. The Vasari Corridor 
was built by Grand Duke Cosimo I de' Medici in 1564 so that his son, Francesco, could visit his wife, Johanna of 
Austria, without having to walk among the “riff-raff” in the streets, e.g. it was built for love.11 Eventually, the tunnel 
was turned into an art gallery that, today, requires special permission to visit. It is most unlikely that any of the 
emergent properties (tourism, tunnel of love, art gallery) of the Ponte Vecchio were foreseen by the original 
builders! 
The sections below describe heuristics for investing in technical credit above and beyond traditional analysis, design 
and construction techniques that may yield unforeseen benefits through emerging properties, as well as improved 
traditional benefits thru increased reliability, safety and longevity. 
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2. Risk-centric Analysis 
During the early phases of a project, risk and hazard analysis are typically addressed as follows: 
 
x Requirements are analyzed for potential hazards. Depending on the regulatory environment, a hazard analysis is 
performed for each requirement for which there may be a risk of injury (personal) or damage (property). If the 
risk is deemed significant (risk is a function of severity and probability of occurrence), a hazard analysis is 
completed. Depending on the results, mitigating procedures or requirements may be added to the requirement 
set. 
x After a preliminary design is complete various safety analyses are performed, such as failure mode effects 
analyses (FMEA).12  Designs are modified to eliminate any discovered hazards. 
  
There are many additional analyses that may be performed, some of them domain specific. For example, in the 
nuclear industry, software programs or codes are utilized to demonstrate the safety of designs, e.g. equipment sizing, 
heat removal analysis, etc. However, risk assessment is normally done in reaction to potential hazards noted by the 
customer or expert, or those found through analyses. . Furthermore, these analyses tend to be stovepipe in nature, 
looking at a part of the system, without looking holistically at the entire environment, processes and lifecycle. De 
Neufville has studied applying system dynamics to forest fire management, extending the analysis beyond pure 
scientific analysis to include the Portuguese political system.13 Nancy Leveson, in her text Engineering a Safer 
World 14, does a thorough analysis of the Bhopal disaster in 1984. A chain of events, including human and 
mechanical failure resulted in 2000 fatalities and over 200,000 injuries. In January of 2000 an Alaskan Airlines MD-
80 crashed killing all 88 people on board. The crash was tied to failure to periodically lubricate the jack screw that 
controlled the horizontal tail position.15 Risk-centric analysis refers to the analysis of the complete environment of 
the system under construction, with extended causal analyses and removal of potential “operator error” by shifting 
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procedural mitigation to requirements mitigation via technical, non-human means. For example, in the case of the 
Bhopal failure, the results of an early analysis might have resulted in the inclusion of mechanical interlocks and 
warnings that pipes were being washed without a slip blind in place. In the case of the MD-80, rather than relying on 
procedural mitigations to ensure that the jack screw was properly lubricated, requirements for sensors and wear 
indicators might have been used to warn that proper lubrication was necessary (Hmmm – don’t cars have indicators 
that give a warning when the oil level is low?). 
Leveson has proposed the STAMP process (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process) by which the 
system after completion will be kept in equilibrium via control loops, e.g. feedback on lubrication, interlocks to 
prevent operator error, etc., rather than relying on human-in-the-loop procedures for safety.16 
Several years ago, I initiated a research project for a visual language to capture hazards and threats at the very 
beginning of the systems lifecycle (instead of waiting for draft requirements and architecture). The result of the 
research was the Unified Requirements Modeling Language (URML), which, during system modeling, treats 
hazards and threats as first-class concepts.17 
To summarize then, Risk-centric analysis is the inclusion of hazard and safety analysis early in the system 
lifecycle, looking at potential event chains holistically (including the entire operating environment), in addition to 
relying on experts in narrow areas to identify risks soon after completion of requirements analysis or preliminary 
design completion. STAMP is a good start, but only if it is applied before the system is designed. 
3. Macro and Micro extensibility 
The dictionary refers to an extensible system as “a system that can be modified by changing or adding features”. I 
further extend the definition to distinguish between the system as a whole and parts thereof:  “macro extensibility” is 
extensibility of the entire system or product being developed, and “micro extensibility” is the extensibility of 
individual subsystems or components. (This does not apply to off-the shelf equipment). Researchers such as de 
Neufville16 have advocated for flexibility in design, both before and after system completion. However, in this 
paper, I distinguish between flexibility in design as something that takes place before delivery/installation, and 
extensibility as something that can be managed by the user or client post-delivery or installation. 
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For example, a Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS, see Figure 2) is used to control the operation of 
power plants, refineries, chemical, pharmaceutical plants, etc. Macro extensibility can, for example, include 
packages that allow the reconfiguration of the entire system to support different domains (e.g. pharmaceutical or 
power). Often, the time constraints for monitoring equipment are quite different. IEEE 1588 requires sequence of 
events such as a turbine trip to have an accuracy of +/-100 nanoseconds. However, routine monitoring of plant 
equipment is typically done at intervals of 10 seconds to 1 minute, depending on the process time constants. 
Consequently, components that are extensible (i.e. can be configured by the user) to do both sequence of events and 
routine monitoring have a competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
Furthermore, extensibility enables emergent properties. For example, the CETRAN simulator, built in the late 
1980s, was originally designed for full scope, replica power plant operation for training plant operators. However, it 
was sufficiently versatile through its extensible feature set, that it was used for “what-if” studies by the department 
of energy, and for the design of chemical plants. Thus the CETRAN simulator is an example of a system with 
emergent properties.18,19 
4. Error-centric design and construction 
When creating system architecture, error prevention can sometimes be an afterthought. For example, when 
electrical engineers design a circuit board, it is a given that the board will have test points that can be used for 
determining whether it is operating properly. The test points are used during the manufacturing process, and for field 
servicing of equipment. Yet when large, complex systems are built, error checking facilities are often added later 
rather than being designed in. I define error-centric design here as the inclusion of errors as first class concepts 
during the initial creation of an architecture and design, so that the system, subsystems, and components provide 
test points (for use during manufacturing and servicing), report problems, and, to the extent possible, self-correct 
and reconfigure (see the paragraph on adaptive systems, below). While resilient systems manage external threats or 
problems, here I refer to reporting and recovery from internal problems that can have a myriad of causes, e.g. failure 
due to wear or software bugs, improperly operating equipment or operator actions, failed interconnections, etc. 
One typical mechanism for identifying failure is the watchdog timer.20 The timer, at a prescribed interval, checks 
its assigned component(s) to ensure proper operation (e.g. “are you ok?”). When the appropriate response is not 
forthcoming, an error is generated, sometimes in the form of an audible alarm. So error-centric design might 
include: 
 
x Extensive use of watchdog timers 
x Hardware and software test points designed-in 
x Wear indicators for hardware (e.g. MD-80 jack screws) 
x Appropriate automatic updates for software 
x Automated remote diagnostics (i.e. diagnostics that can be initiated remotely, and can identify and repair 
problems with no human in the loop). 
 
Automated updates are especially conducive to the cultivation of emergent properties; new features, not 
originally conceived during design, could be added at a later date to provide previously unforeseen benefits. 
5. Adaptive and autonomous principles 
There is no consensus on the definition of an autonomous system. One definition that may apply when 
considering the architecture of a system is that of Shani: (paraphrasing) “…a system is recursively self-reliant if it 
exerts active control over its first-order self-reliance by constructing and maintaining endogenously the boundary 
conditions which enable it to continue to contribute to its own endurance while facing situations – both external and 
internal – that would be detrimental otherwise”.21 Most living organisms are autonomous; they can function and 
maintain their existence without external guidance, especially in the face of hardship. Non-living systems can be 
considered autonomous if, once they are turned on, they can function and also persevere in the face of hardship 
without external guidance. 
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One example of an autonomous system is a space probe such as the Voyager. It can perform its mission in a harsh 
environment without external guidance. It can recover from power failure, micro-meteor strikes, make decisions and 
continue to perform its mission (e.g. send back pictures). 
A more aggressive, futuristic example of an autonomous system would be a passenger airline, where 
communication is lost, the pilots are incapacitated, yet the plane can still reach its destination and land without 
injury to the passengers or damage to the plane. 
Holland defines system adaptability as “…how systems can generate procedures enabling them to adjust 
efficiently to their environments”.22 If we accept that definition, then adaptive systems can be considered a subset of 
the properties of an autonomous system. A simple example of an adaptive feature is “all-wheel drive”, where a 
vehicle can improve traction based on the road surface by adjusting which wheels drive, and how much power they 
are given. Adaptive systems, ipso facto, enable emergent properties.  
 
What distinguishes an adaptive system from the banking of technical credit is where: 
 
x Not just the system, but every subsystem or component therein is examined for possible adaptive features 
x Adaptive behavior is designed in for longevity, flexibility and reliability rather than to meet a prescribed set of 
customer requirements. 
 
For example, in the DACS shown in figure 2, every element of the system (excepting connectors) is amenable to 
some form of adaptive behavior, from switchable power supplies and voltages, to automatically reconfiguring 
sensors and remote termination devices.  
6.  Market-centric approach to requirements 
The term “market-centric design”, sometimes referred to as “user-centric design” is usually applied to “putting 
people first”.22 That is, users are involved at each stage of the design. I am here referring to something completely 
different. My alternative definition is: “Using draft marketing material for each software or hardware part (e.g. 
subsystem, assembly, component…) of the system to better describe the desired end product, whether the part is to 
be sold independently or not”. For example, during the development of a power-plant control system, a middleware 
communication layer was needed as a platform to support real-time communication between the various 
components.18 Heterogeneous computers were used, e.g. even floating point numbers on different nodes used 
different internal formats. Consequently, the middleware not only managed message flow, but also performed data 
conversion. In order to better understand and communicate functionality, a product specification sheet was created, 
as though the intent was to sell the communication layer as a separate product. This approach was then extended to 
every component of the system, including graphics, I/O, and computation components (some of which included 
hardware).  These specification sheets helped to crystalize for the designers, customers, and management, what the 
delivered system would include. The specification sheets were distributed at trade shows; the approach worked well 
enough to increase sales of the CETRAN product. Some of the components were eventually sold to previously 
unanticipated markets and the graphics and communication subsystems were reused in other commercial power 
plant products such as thermal analyzers. (These are examples of emergent properties). 
Finally, the design and manufacturing of components as part of system development, although heavily supplanted 
by commercial off-the-shelf components (COTS), is not yet dead. Barry Boehm points out, for example that COTS 
incompatibilities, upgrades, and loss of support account for a surprisingly large number of system failures.24 
Moreover, there are other reasons for keeping the development of components in house, including improved control 
of reliability, limited 3rd party warrantees and liability or management of performance characteristics. 
7. Over-engineering 
Paul Rako, in his editorial on over-engineering states: “Good design is about making compromises on a 
continuum of choices”.25 That is, over-engineering can be interpreted as simply delivering a system that exceeds the 
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minimum specified functionality, performance and reliability. I might add “Today’s over-engineered system is 
tomorrow’s just-enough system.”  
One definition of system thinking is “the process of understanding how things influence one another within a 
whole”.26 Often, during the elicitation of requirements and the design of systems, the question arises, “how much is 
enough?” The answer to that question can be driven by budget, politics, engineering, uncertainty, or a combination 
thereof. However, the question is usually asked in the context of a specific short term project, and not in the context 
of the overall environment (including society). There are many examples of situations where over-engineering 
“saved the day”. The Ponte Vecchio is one example, surviving major floods that destroyed lesser structures.  
Over-engineering can be as simple as conscientiously building a system using the best available components and 
subsystems; it might involve true systems thinking, e.g. who will use this system, how long will it be used, and what 
happens if it fails? 
Over-engineering a system is a form of investment (technical credit) that may pay expected (reputation, longevity 
of product) or unexpected (emergent properties) dividends. The Ponte Vecchio is just one example. Another 
example of an over-engineered product is the B-52 bomber. It was introduced in 1952 specifically for delivering 
nuclear weapons, i.e. as a nuclear deterrent.27 Now, it is in service as a conventional bomber and is projected to 
remain in service until 2040 (i.e. note the two emergent properties of unusual longevity and changed role). 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have suggested that investment in system development, above and beyond the minimum required 
for product or system delivery, can be considered a form of technical credit. In some cases, this credit can yield 
dividends many times the cost of the initial investment through emergent properties. I have defined or provided 
additional definitions for the terms “technical credit”, “market-centric design”, “error-centric design”, macro and 
micro extensibility, and “risk-centric analysis”. Finally, I have suggested a set of heuristics that contribute to the 
investment in technical credit and may yield unexpected dividends in the form of emergent properties. The use of 
these heuristics as part of a project checklist (even if considered and discarded) may. Through emergent system 
properties, may pay unexpected dividends to the project, the customer, and even to society. 
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